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INTRODUCTION
Professor Stephen Subrin’s expansive body of scholarship concerning the
history, development, and implementation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has covered vast terrain.1 From this impressive background, he and Pro* Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. Many thanks to the participants of the symposium at Northeastern University School of Law, entitled Through a
Glass Starkly: Civil Procedure Reassessed, for their thoughtful feedback on the ideas contained in this essay.
1
See, e.g., Phyllis Tropper Baumann, Judith Olans Brown & Stephen N. Subrin, Substance
in the Shadow of Procedure: The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII
Cases, 33 B.C. L. REV. 211 (1992); Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation
and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399
(2011); Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L.
REV. 299 (2002); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691 (1998); Stephen N.
Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27 (1994) [hereinafter Subrin, Fudge Points];
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin, How
Equity Conquered Common Law]; Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive
Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DEN. U. L. REV.
377 (2010) [hereinafter Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure]; Stephen N.
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fessor Thomas Main just last year described how we find ourselves in a new
“distinct, fourth era” of civil procedure.2 Unlike the first three eras3—namely
the import of the English common law/equity system,4 the Field Code,5 and the
advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure6—this fourth era, they opine, is
difficult to define because there was no public debate, no formal adoption, and
no official implementation.7 Rather, it is characterized by “back door” efforts
to cut back on substantive rights by eroding the procedures used to vindicate
them.8 They provide countless compelling examples, including the Supreme
Court’s ratcheting up of the pleading standard to the amorphously defined
“plausibility pleading” as announced in its decisions in Twombly and Iqbal,9
the burdening of ordinary discovery mechanisms,10 and the increased prominence of summary judgment as a dispute resolution mechanism, particularly
after the 1986 so-called summary judgment triology.11
Professors Subrin and Main’s account of the Fourth Era is compelling not
just in documenting a new paradigm of case resolution, but in critiquing the
method of its adoption:
Conspicuously absent from the history of the fourth era of procedure is the
policy debate that should occur when lawmakers and the public are presented
with a choice between the competing visions of the third and fourth eras. ProceSubrin, Thoughts on Misjudging Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 513 (2007); Stephen N. Subrin,
Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound Procedural System: The Case
for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79 (1997).
2
Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162
U. PA. L. REV. 1839, 1841 (2014).
3
They admit that there is some debate about whether the prior three eras were each internally cohesive, but conclude it is appropriate to treat them as such. Id. at 1842 n.11.
4
Id. at 1842 (noting that on top of merely the importation of English common law and equity court systems, the U.S. added a layer of federal courts to the mix).
5
The Field Codes are so named after the New York lawyer David Dudley Field, who campaigned to reform the judicial system in the mid 1800s, leading to the merger of law and equity and the drive to simplify procedure to eliminate hyper-technicality. See Stephen N.
Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311, 311, 316–19 (documenting Field’s objectives in reforming legal process).
6
The Federal Rules were adopted in 1938. Subrin & Main, supra note 2, at 1843.
7
Id. at 1856–57.
8
Id. at 1869 (arguing the conservative opposition to social safety net programs may have
led to various strategies to dismantle them, one of which was an ultimately successful strategy to “undermine the procedural platform upon which substantive rights rely, but to [do] so
through the back door—incrementally, through judicial decisions”).
9
Id. at 1848; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
10
Subrin & Main, supra note 2, at 1849–51 (citing the narrowing of the scope of discovery,
additional discovery hurdles such as conferences and initial disclosures, and the growth of
judicial supervision of discovery, all of which have been adopted as supposed solutions to a
problem of excessive discovery that Subrin and Main explain does not in reality exist in
most cases).
11
Id. at 1851 & n.70 (collecting evidence of the expanding role of summary judgment, contrary to the intent that it serve as “an exceptional remedy with a very limited role”).
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dure is power, of course, so the stakes of choosing one over the other produces
different winners and losers. In a debate, the trade-offs between the two visions
would be explored, the empirical data gathered, and the interested constituencies
consulted. Yet that debate never happened. Indeed, it is all-too-fitting that the
third era itself was denied notice and the right to be heard before it was interred
by judges.12

While the rising conservative political ideology of the federal judiciary is an
easy target for blame in this regard,13 Professors Subrin and Main also document a host of practical factors that fueled the Fourth Era, including the growth
in civil caseloads and corresponding need for case management solutions.14
This essay explores one aspect of procedural law that might be considered
a Fourth Era phenomenon: the departure from the transsubstantive design of
the Federal Rules by judicial decisions that create substance-specific procedure
operating in their shadow. Notably, like other Fourth Era features, these substance-specific procedural practices are generated outside the relative transparency of legislative processes or even federal civil rulemaking procedures.
Using Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) litigation as an example of
how the Federal Rules allow and even condone shadow procedure, this Article
contends that while substance-specific process may be a useful reform in some
instances, shadow substance-specific procedures lack legitimacy.15 In fact, the
effect of strict adherence to formal transsubstantivity combined with the judicially created shadow substance-specificity risks driving litigants from the
courthouse doors to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.16 In this context, the irony Professors Subrin and Main describe in the failure of the Third
Era to receive its own public hearing of sorts is doubly salient: this nontransparent shadow procedure affects government transparency itself by hindering the substantive rights of the public to access government information and
learn what our government is up to under FOIA.17
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly describes the origins of
transsubstantive procedural design and details the mechanisms by which procedure has departed from that principle in limited ways. Part II delves deeply
into the process by which courts have created substance-specific procedural
rules in FOIA litigation. It argues that courts have employed a sort of common
12

Id. at 1856–57 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1859, 1869–74 (documenting how the rise in conservative legal movements, including organizations such as the Federalist Society and the various conservative legal foundations fueled a political shift in the federal judiciary).
14
Id. at 1860–68. The growth in federal civil cases is attributed in large part to the creation
of brand-new federal statutory rights and the growth of the legal profession. Id. at 1859.
Case management solutions took various forms, but mostly in the culture shift toward judicial intervention into case negotiations and settlement, as well as increased accountability for
individual judges efficiency in moving cases through the federal system. Id. at 1861–63.
15
See infra Part III.A.
16
See infra Part III.C.
17
See infra Part III.B.
13
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law approach to FOIA litigation processes, departing in significant aspects
from the transsubstantive Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Part III contends
that common law substance-specific procedural rules, like the ones used in
FOIA litigation, implicate important concerns regarding the legitimacy of the
judiciary, the soundness of the processes, and the impetus for litigants to avoid
the courthouse altogether.
I.

TRANSSUBSTANTIVITY

Procedural rules are transsubstantive when they apply to all cases, regardless of the substance of the claims.18 That is, the same set of rules will decide
tort cases arising out of car accidents as will decide civil rights violations as
will decide corporate contract disputes.19 The modern student of civil procedure will practically take this principle for granted; with limited exceptions, the
current procedural regime fully embraces transsubstantive procedural design.20
In fact, however, transsubstantivity was viewed as one of the major
achievements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.21 At common law, developed in England and borrowed in the earliest American legal systems, substance and procedure were inseparable.22 Through a system of writs, each type
of action had a process for obtaining a particular type of remedy; the substantive rights and remedies available were dependent on the particular procedure.23
The specificity of the writs and technicalities that often thwarted otherwise
meritorious claims led to the first prominent set of procedural reforms. In the
18

David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 376 (2010) [hereinafter Marcus, Past, Present, and Future].
Transsubstantivity has also been used to describe a system that applies the same rules to all
cases regardless of case size, rather than substantive claim. Subrin, The Limitations of
Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 1, at 378.
19
See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts . . . .” (emphasis added)).
20
See FED. R. CIV. P. 81(a) (enumerating a limited list of types of proceedings not governed
by the federal rules, such as bankruptcy, certain admiralty matters, citizenship proceedings).
As discussed below, there are also departures from the transsubstantive nature of the federal
rules in particular substantive statutes. See infra notes 37–67 and accompanying text.
21
See Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18, at 372; see also Robert M. Cover,
For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 718
(1975) (referring to the “ongoing trans-substantive achievement of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure”).
22
Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18, at 382–83.
23
Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 1, at 379.
The various forms of action [writs] required the pleader to make quite specific and technical allegations in his complaint that differed depending on the remedy pursued. The processes that
followed as a case proceeded varied. The chosen form would determine the nature of the defendant’s responsive pleading, the requirements for service of process, whether a court could enter a default judgment, the form of trial, and the means of executing judgments. General procedural rules did not exist . . . .

Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18, at 382 (footnotes omitted).
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mid-1800s, David Dudley Field, a New York lawyer, drafted a code of procedure—widely referred to as the Field Code—later adopted in large measure by
most American jurisdictions.24 The Field Code championed the notion of substance as distinct from procedure and embraced the principles of transsubstantivity.25 Implementation of the code, however, failed to live up to its ideal as
courts often imported common law concepts in interpreting the code and in any
event adoption of the code remained uneven.26 Substance specificity accordingly lived on.
The drafters of the Federal Rules were committed to various ideals for their
new procedural regime. Central among them were commitments to simplicity
and avoidance of the technicality of the common law system.27 Transsubstantivity was a logical extension of this goal; having only one set of straightforward rules was at the heart of the drafters’ strategy to eliminate overly technical litigation processes.28 In fact, the deliberations of the initial Advisory
Committee that drafted the Federal Rules included no debate at all about
whether the same rules would apply to all types of cases.29 Thus, like the Field
Code, the Federal Rules were designed as transsubstantive, but beyond the
Field Code, the Rules eliminated all vestiges of language that could be interpreted against the backdrop of common law principles.30 Accordingly, the Federal Rules achieved transsubstantivity not only in theory, but also in practice.
This achievement, while celebrated by many,31 has certainly not received
universal acclaim.32 Professor Subrin made an early case for limited substance24

Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18 at 388, 390. At the turn of the twentieth-century, a version of the Field Code had been adopted in twenty-five states and four territories. Id. at 390.
25
Id. at 389–90. In particular, Field believed that transsubstantivity would promote simplicity and thus better implementation of substantive law. Id. at 389.
26
Id. at 392–93. Many in the profession believed, for instance that “[t]he necessary link between procedural form and substantive rights . . . rendered trans-substantive procedure impossible.” Id.
27
Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 1, at 942–43.
28
Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18, at 394–95.
29
Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 1, at 383.
30
Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18, at 394 (“The Federal Rules left substance-specific procedure behind by closing the entry points through which the forms of action had crept back into the code reforms.”).
31
See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-trans-substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 2067, 2068–69 (1989) (arguing, in favor of transsubstantivity, that the civil
rulemaking process is ill-suited to the types of political considerations inherent in any substance-specific rule and that in any case substantive-specific procedural rules are not likely
to address the problems they may purport to resolve); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery
Vices and Trans-substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 2237, 2238 (1989) (extolling the benefits of transsubstantivity in allowing flexibility
for the creation of new substantive rights with worry that the procedural system is too rigid
to accommodate them); Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for
Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761, 779 (1993) (arguing that “a shift away from
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specific rules, particularly with respect to discovery.33 Some substantive areas,
he contended, lend themselves to particular rules about the scope of core discovery, and experts and practitioners in those fields tend to know what a typical
case requires.34 He also argued that certain case types lend themselves to particularized rules concerning minimal allegations in the complaint, dependent on
the amount of detail the plaintiff would be expected to know in a particular situation.35 In fact, he declared, “[t]he price of trying to apply the same rules to all
cases inevitably leads to general, vague, and flexible rules; such rules provide
very little guidance for the bar or bench.”36
To be sure, perfect adherence to transsubstantive procedure has never been
truly achieved. Both Congress and state legislatures have enacted substancespecific procedural rules for certain types of litigation. For instance, Congress
enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which, among other things, adjusted
pleading practice, processes for dismissing a complaint, and obligations of a
defendant to respond.37 Likewise, Congress heightened the pleading standard
for securities litigation in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995.38 Sometimes Congress has acted to liberalize access to civil litigation on
a substance-specific basis, too. For instance, several environmental statutes allow intervention as of right to join a government enforcement action for citizens who are subject to a so-called “diligent prosecution bar” to bringing their
own suits, a broader intervention provision than the Federal Rules provide.39
trans-substantive procedure threatens to create losers of both the [claim] specific and general
type”).
32
See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The
Example of Rule 11, 137 PA. L. REV. 1925, 1940 (1989) (“No one I know is suggesting a
return to the forms of action or a wholesale rejection of trans-substantive procedure. Some of
us, however, are suggesting that it is time both to face facts, in particular the fact that uniformity and trans-substantivity rhetoric are a sham, and to find out the facts, in particular the
facts about discretionary justice.”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Halting Devolution or Bleak to the
Future: Subrin’s New-Old Procedure as a Possible Antidote to Dreyfuss’s “Tolstoy Problem”, 46 FLA. L. REV. 57, 78, 84 (1994) (declaring, in a section entitled “Confessions of a
Recalcitrant Transubstantivist,” that “[t]he creeping growth of transubstantive rules like disclosure, rules that increase the burdens on counsel and clients but are predicted not to
achieve offsetting benefits, persuade me to suggest that introducing case-specific discovery
guidelines may make civil discovery less complex, less erratic, and easier to administer”
(footnote omitted)).
33
Subrin, Fudge Points, supra note 1, at 28.
34
Id. at 47, 48. As examples, Professor Subrin cites products liability, antitrust, securities
fraud, section 1983, employment discrimination, and malpractice suits. Id. at 48.
35
Id. at 48.
36
Id. at 46.
37
Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18, at 405.
38
Id. at 406.
39
See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (2012); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(b)(1)(B) (2012); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i) (2012); see also Carl Tobias, The Transformation of Transsubstantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1501, 1502–03 (1992) (citing these special intervention statutes as an example of the erosion of transsubstantivity). Further modification of the
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State legislatures across the country have also had occasion to embrace substance-specificity. Numerous states have enacted specialized procedures for
medical malpractice cases, including special filing requirements, heightened
pleading standards, and evidentiary rules.40 These legislative developments
have been described as “consistent with a retreat from trans-substantivity as a
foundational principle for American civil procedure.”41
In contrast, however, Professor David Marcus has demonstrated that
courts, in exercising their powers to fashion procedural rules, have been remarkably consistent in their adherence to formal transsubstantivity.42 Notably,
the civil rulemaking process has resulted in only a handful of Federal Rules
that are even arguably substance-specific,43 and local rules adopted by federal
district courts likewise are overwhelmingly transsubstantive.44 We are, it
seems, a long way from abandoning the principle as a formal matter.
Although the continued dominance of formally transsubstantive rules can
be established, there remains the question of whether the rules are applied in a
transsubstantive manner in practice. For example, Professor Arthur Miller recently claimed that not only do Twombly and Iqbal effectuate a change to the
pleading standard as enunciated in the Federal Rules, but that with them, “it is
quite possible that the Court implicitly abandoned or compromised its devotion
to the transsubstantive character of the Rules.”45 It may have done so, he
claims, by requiring its new “plausibility” standard to be applied contextually,
thereby tolerating “divergent applications” of the pleading rule.46
But pleading is not the only area potentially subject to substance-specific
applications. One central and inherent weakness of transsubstantive rules is the
vast discretion it leaves to judges to fashion a process for each individual
rules of intervention in the environmental context are possible. Both industry and environmental groups have voiced objections to the application of Rule 24 to environmental disputes, see Courtney R. McVean & Justin R. Pidot, Environmental Settlements and Administrative Law, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 211–13 (2015), and Congress is considering
legislation that would add a provision to the Endangered Species Act that would provide affected parties a “reasonable opportunity to move to intervene” after the filing of a consent
decree and further would create a “rebuttable presumption” that the interests of an “affected
party . . . would not be represented adequately” by the government. S. 19, 113th Cong.
§ 2(1) (2013).
40
Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18, at 407.
41
Id. at 409.
42
Id. at 413.
43
Professor Marcus reports one count of substance-specific rules within the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure as numbering “only six subsections of the more than ninety Federal
Rules.” Id. For example, Rule 5.2(c) limits remote access to electronic files in social security
appeals and immigration cases, and Rule 71.1 details separate procedures for actions to condemn property. See id. at 413 n.262 (listing the substance-specific federal rules).
44
Id. at 414 (reporting that in a survey of ten federal districts, only five percent of all local
rules “could arguably be deemed substance-specific”).
45
Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 91 (2010).
46
Id. at 91–92.
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case.47 Depending on how this discretion is exercised, it can itself lead to an
erosion of transsubstantivity through the collective actions of judges and reliance on precedent.48
As Professor Subrin has demonstrated, transsubstantivity and discretion are
inherently linked.49 In perhaps his most well known work, How Equity Conquered Common Law, Professor Subrin chronicles the history of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and demonstrates that the “underlying philosophy of,
and procedural choices embodied in, the Federal Rules were almost universally
drawn from equity rather than common law.”50 Two of the most important
ways that equity principles are enshrined in the Federal Rules are the separation
between procedure and substance (and resulting transsubstantive design) and
the Rules’ expansive judicial discretion.51 In fact, since cases can differ vastly
from one another, a failure to afford discretion to judges could, according to
Professor Marcus, “jeopardize[] the success of a trans-substantive code.”52 And
other scholars agree: “Necessarily, therefore, trans-substantivism implies a certain amount of discretion.”53 The result, however, was that by design, specifics
were left to judges to determine within the broad confines of the Federal
Rules.54
Discretion, however, does not automatically lead to substance-specific processes. It could simply lead to individualized, ad hoc decision making to
achieve the best justice possible in each individual case as envisioned by the
drafters of the rules.55 This type of ad hoc decision making, while it has been
criticized as representing a departure from transsubstantivity,56 does not inher47

See id. at 92 (“[T]he vast reservoir of judicial discretion in the application of the Federal
Rules, coupled with the restraints on appellate review imposed by the final-judgment rule,
probably undermines the transsubstantivity principle.” (footnote omitted)).
48
Id. (noting that “[v]iewed realistically, the substance behind the catechism of transsubstantivity actually may have been discarded in all but name long before Twombly and Iqbal”).
49
Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 1, at 922.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 923–24. Equity principles are also evidenced in the low pleading threshold, liberal
joinder, expansive discovery, flexible remedies, judicial control over juries, and other aspects. Id.
52
Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18, at 396.
53
Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of
Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1747 (1992).
54
Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 1, at 942. “The drafters of the
Federal Rules recognized that the system they were creating lacked restraint.” Id. at 975.
55
Indeed, as Professor Subrin notes, “It was thought that there was no other way [other than
discretion] to avoid problems of technicality inherent in interpreting the Field Code and the
Throop Code.” Id. at 942.
56
Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1474 (1987)
(“Many of the Federal Rules authorize essentially ad hoc decisions and therefore are transsubstantive in only the most trivial sense.”); Tidmarsh, supra note 53 (“Paradoxically, however, the discretion to fashion case-specific rules also threatens trans-substantvism—not at
the level of formal rule, but at the level of rule implementation in individual cases.”).
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ently lead to the application of substance-specific process.57 It could simply
lead to nonuniformity, or similar cases receiving different treatment.
On the other hand, this discretion can lead to substance-specific process
when the formally transsubstantive rules are applied, through the use of discretion, consistently one way in some substantive areas, and another way in other
types of cases.58 Moreover, courts may adopt precedent-setting language in certain cases concerning the proper application of the rules to a class of cases,
leading to some formalization of substance specificity.59 As discussed below,
of the various ways that substance-specific rules may arise, judicial common
law rules are the hardest to identify and the most structurally problematic. The
remainder of this article uses litigation under FOIA to exemplify the troubling
implications.
II. SPECIAL FOIA PROCEDURES
FOIA is the public’s primary vehicle for obtaining government-held information.60 Although it does require limited affirmative disclosure or publication of government records,61 its hallmark provision embraces a request-andresponse model of making agencies more transparent, requiring the government
to produce records to any person who asks,62 subject only to nine statutorily
listed exemptions.63 If the government denies a request for information under

57

Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18, at 378.
See David Marcus, Trans-substantivity and the Processes of American Law, 2013 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 1191, 1204.
59
For example, prior to the Supreme Court weighing in, courts of appeals had fashioned
substance-specific pleading standards in Title VII cases in precedential opinions that were
widely followed. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002).
60
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2012). It certainly, however, is not the only mechanism. For
instance, the Federal Advisory Committee Act requires certain balance and transparency on
advisory committees, see 5 U.S.C. Appx. § 5, the Sunshine Act requires certain agency
meetings to be open to the public, see 5 U.S.C. § 552b, and the Privacy Act requires certain
personal records to be made available, see id. at § 552a. In addition, informal disclosure—
either with official sanction such as planting information in the press, or without official
sanction, i.e., leaking—plays a critical role in informing the public about the government’s
activities. See generally David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512 (2013)
(describing the various ways in which allowing unauthorized information disclosures serves
the government’s interests, including by fostering the public’s belief that it will by some
means learn of any important governmental policies).
61
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1), (2).
62
Id. at § 552(a)(3)(A).
63
Id. at § 552(b)(1)–(9). The exemptions cover records that are properly classified for national security reasons, certain internal records, records exempt from disclosure by other
statutory provisions, trade secret and confidential commercial and financial information,
records that would be privileged in civil discovery, records that if released would constitute
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, certain law enforcement records, certain
information about financial regulation, and certain information about wells. Id.
58
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FOIA, the requester has the right, after exhausting administrative remedies, to
challenge that denial by bringing a lawsuit in federal court.64
The same Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern FOIA lawsuits as govern other civil suits.65 And while FOIA litigation involves a federal agency, it is
unlike litigation reviewing most other agency actions, review of which is typically deferential and is confined to the administrative record.66 Instead, whether
records are exempt from mandatory disclosure under FOIA is a question that is
determined de novo by the district court on a record created in litigation.67 Accordingly, it is much more like a host of other statutory rights that can be vindicated in a typical civil suit in federal district court.
While the same procedural rules apply as a formal matter in FOIA litigation as in other civil cases, judges have, through the exercise of discretion, consistently applied different processes in practice. That is, as detailed below,
courts exercise discretion categorically and constrain themselves by applying
precedent dictating the processes to be applied in FOIA cases. In effect, judges,
through individual decisions, have made a system of substance-specific procedural rules for FOIA litigation.
A. Discovery Abolished
Departure from typical litigation process in FOIA cases begins with discovery. Discovery rules are an area of civil procedure often under attack, including for their one-size-fits-all approach, which leads to discovery abuses in
some cases.68 Overzealous use of discovery and the permissiveness of the dis64

Id. at § 552(a)(4)(B).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 1, 81 (describing the applicability of the rules and not listing FOIA
actions as exempt from their reach).
66
For a full discussion of the ways in which judicial review of FOIA determinations differs
from typical agency litigation and instead resembles other civil litigation, see Margaret B.
Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, 54 B.C. L. REV. 185, 196–200 (2013).
67
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) provides:
65

68

On complaint, the district court of the United States in the district in which the complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency records are situated, or
in the District of Columbia, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant. In such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo, and may examine the contents
of such agency records in camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be
withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and the burden
is on the agency to sustain its action.

See John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation
Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 553 (2010) (surveying the “escalating problems in the U.S. civil
discovery system and how they can be remedied”); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Discovery Abuse Revisited: Some Specific Proposals to Amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 U.S.F.
L. REV. 189, 191–92 (1992) (discussing potential preclusionary rather than monetary sanctions for discovery abuse); Frank H. Easterbrook, Comment, Discovery As Abuse, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 635, 648 (1989) (arguing that discovery abuse is a serious problem worth addressing,
and that it is rooted in excessive uncertainty, allocation of costs, and judicial control);
Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 1, at 403 (describing a
proposal for simple track litigation in federal court with reduced discovery, citing the prob-
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covery rules may well create some problems that need to be addressed. In
FOIA cases, however, the problem is the opposite: too little discovery. In fact,
courts have all but precluded any discovery whatsoever in FOIA litigation.
An example helps illustrate the special discovery procedures dictated by
the courts in FOIA cases. Antique aircraft enthusiast Greg Herrick filed a Freedom of Information Act request with the Federal Aviation Administration
(“FAA”) seeking construction specifications for an antique F-45 aircraft submitted for regulatory purposes by the Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation, maker of the F-45.69 Herrick was himself undertaking to restore an F-45
aircraft he owned, only sixteen of which were ever built and only approximately three of which still existed.70 When the FAA denied his request, asserting
that the records were exempt from FOIA’s mandatory disclosure provision because they constituted trade secrets, he exercised his right to sue, challenging
the legality of the FAA’s refusal to disclose the records.71
One aspect of the litigation that ensued is now well known to civil procedure professors and students alike. After Herrick lost his suit in the district
court,72 and his appeal to the Tenth Circuit,73 Brent Taylor filed a FOIA request
with the FAA for the very same records and likewise brought a lawsuit—this
time in the D.C. District Court—when he failed to receive a response by the
statutory deadline.74 The D.C. District Court and the D.C. Circuit both concluded that Taylor’s lawsuit was barred by claim preclusion, or res judicata, on
lems with excessive discovery). But see Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1994) (arguing that claims of discovery abuse are empirically
unfounded and rule amendments based on the rhetoric are dangerous for the civil justice system).
69
Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2002).
70
Herrick v. Garvey, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1323 (D. Wyo. 2000).
71
Herrick, 298 F.3d at 1188.
72
Herrick, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1322. In particular, the court found that the records included
“drawings and blueprints required to manufacture the F-45—all materials clearly used in the
production process for this aircraft and which are the end product of innovation and substantial effort.” Id. at 1328. Applying a common formulation, the court declared that these materials “do come within the scope of Exemption 4” because they meet the
definition of trade secret as secret, commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or device used
for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of trade commodities and that can be
said to be the end product of either innovation or substantial effort, with a direct relationship between the trade secret and the productive process.

Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (exempting trade secrets from mandatory disclosure under
FOIA).
73
Herrick, 298 F.3d at 1188. The Tenth Circuit rejected Herrick’s three arguments on appeal that the records were not actually owned by the corporate successor to Fairchild, that
the records were not secret because FAA had been given permission to share them publicly,
and that the current corporate objection to their release does not constitute a reinstatement of
secret status. Id. at 1190.
74
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 887–88 (2008). A failure to receive a response within
the twenty-business day deadline is deemed a constructive denial and administrative exhaustion of remedies, allowing for immediate filing of suit. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A), (a)(6)(C)(i).
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the theory that Taylor was “virtually represented” in Herrick’s lawsuit because
of the two plaintiffs’ prior relationship, membership in the same antique aircraft association (of which Taylor was the president), and representation by the
same attorney.75 The Supreme Court took the case, definitively barring the doctrine of virtual representation and holding a strict line on the application of res
judicata; Taylor’s lawsuit could proceed.76
While the Supreme Court’s opinion was an important one in the area of
claim preclusion, another aspect of the litigation—a discovery battle that occurred at the district court level—should also cause proceduralists to pause.
Prior to the case’s ascent to the high court, it had begun as typical civil litigation. Taylor filed a complaint alleging the FAA had failed to respond to his request,77 and the parties agreed to stay the litigation while the FAA produced a
response.78 When the FAA arrived at a response denying Taylor access to the
records, it then answered the complaint.79 Taylor then served discovery requests on the FAA.80
It was clear from the outset that the crux of the case on the merits would
turn on whether the requested records had actually been maintained as confidential, a necessary condition for a trade secret claim. In fact, a 1955 letter
from Fairchild authorized the government to loan out the data to anyone for the
purpose of making repairs or replacement parts without the need for prior permission, raising serious questions about the confidentiality of these records.81
Accordingly, Taylor’s discovery requests focused on gathering information
about whether the records had been maintained confidentially or whether they
had been previously disclosed to third parties.82
75

Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d 965, 969–71 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The D.C. Circuit declared that:
For a party to be deemed the “virtual representative” of a party to a later suit making the
same claim, the two parties must have the same interests and those interests must have been adequately represented in the first litigation. In addition, there must be a close relationship between
the two, or the new party must have participated substantially in the prior litigation or engaged
in tactical maneuvering to avoid the preclusive effects of the first decision.

Id. at 978.
76
Taylor, 553 U.S. at 904.
77
Freedom of Information Act Complaint at 2, para. 7, Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d 965
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 03-00173), 2003 WL 24057317.
78
Minute Order Granting Joint Motion to Stay, Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d 965 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (No. 03-00173).
79
Defendant’s Answer, Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d 965 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 03-00173),
2003 WL 24057522.
80
Plaintiff’s Motion to Allow Discovery (filed Jan. 5, 2004), Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d
965 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 03-00173) [hereinafter Taylor Plaintiff’s Discovery Motion].
81
Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F.3d 1184, 1193 (10th Cir. 2002).
82
See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Allow Discovery, Taylor v. Blakey,
490 F.3d 965 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 03-00173). For instance, the proposed interrogatories
included, with the 1955 letter, “Did this letter authorize public access to and borrowing of
the plans and specifications which the Federal Aviation Administration (or its predecessor
agency) keeps on file that support the type certificates for certain Fairchild Aircraft, including the F-45 Aircraft?” and “If it is contended that this letter was rescinded, or withdrawn,
state the date of such rescission or withdrawal, and identify the document(s) you contend
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What happened next took an unusual turn. After requesting that the parties
submit a status report on the case, the court announced that Taylor would need
to file a motion for leave to take discovery, and that the FAA therefore need not
respond to the already-served discovery requests or file a motion for a protective order with respect thereto.83 The rationale for this order was simply that
discovery is not ordinarily permitted in a FOIA case.84
Taylor’s quest to access basic discovery tools did not encounter merely another procedural hurdle, but what would become a procedural roadblock. Taylor filed the requested motion to allow discovery, documenting the need for
discovery to establish whether the records were maintained confidentially or,
alternatively, how the government reclaimed confidentiality of records that
were in the public domain as a result of the 1955 letter.85 But the request for
discovery was denied as premature, the court declaring that “discovery should
only occur after the government has moved for summary judgment and submitted its supporting affidavits and memorandum of law.”86
Taylor’s discovery battle did not end there. Shortly after the initial discovery order, the Fairchild Corporation, a corporate successor to the manufacturer
of the F-45, intervened as a defendant, and litigation over the claim preclusion
question ensued.87 Once the Supreme Court allowed the case to proceed, however, it was remanded to the district court and again stood in the posture of a
case where nothing more than pleadings had been completed.88 Taylor accord-

effect such withdrawal or rescission?” and “Does the Federal Aviation Administration maintain a record(s) of persons who have been given access to the requested information and, if
so, how far back that record(s) go. State the names, addresses and dates of access.” Taylor
Plaintiff’s Discovery Motion, supra note 80, at Exhibit Plaintiff’s Interrogatories to Defendant at 3.
83
Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion
to Allow Discovery at 4, Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d 965 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 03-00173),
2003 WL 24057524 (“During a telephone conference with the parties and a law clerk in attendance on or about December 11, 2003, the parties were told that, in the circumstances of
this case and because discovery is not ordinarily permitted in a FOIA case, plaintiff would
need to file a motion seeking discovery. It was agreed that defendant need not file a motion
for a protective order pertaining to discovery, because the Court had not yet ruled that plaintiff was entitled to discovery.”).
84
Id.
85
Taylor Plaintiff’s Discovery Motion, supra note 80.
86
Memorandum Opinion Denying the Plaintiff’s Motion for Discovery at 4, Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d 965 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 03-00173). The court further explained: “A rationale for waiting for the government’s motion and supporting documents is that, prior to
receiving these materials, the court has insufficient information to determine the applicability of the FOIA exemption at issue.” Id. at 4–5.
87
Motion to Intervene, Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d 965 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 03-00173).
88
See Joint Status Report at 1, Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d 965 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 0300173) (explaining that the effect of the Supreme Court’s ruling was to allow the case to
move forward with next steps, to wit, any possible discovery and then to summary judgment
motions).

1506

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:1493

ingly renewed his motion to allow discovery.89 He again advanced arguments
about the need for discovery, this time focusing on the need to gather information that would shed light on the truth or falsity of a key affidavit, one that
evidenced apparent weakness in the personal knowledge of the affiant, among
other problems.90
Again, however, Taylor’s efforts to access discovery were denied.91 This
time, the court acknowledged Taylor’s concern that without discovery, he
would be “unable to effectively oppose a potential motion for summary judgment,” but concluded that the “appropriate mechanism for the plaintiff to seek
such relief, however, is through a Rule 56(f) motion”92 filed after the government files for summary judgment.93 “At that point,” the court declared, it
would have “the opportunity to review the merits of the defendants’ exemption
claim and [would] be better suited to make a discovery ruling.”94 Accordingly,
Taylor had no choice but to proceed to the summary judgment stage of the case
having had no opportunity whatsoever to use discovery to gather evidence that
may help him win his own motion or defeat that of the government.95
The court in Taylor’s case did not invent these discovery rules out of thin
air. In fact, the court’s decision is in keeping with a long history of decisions
enumerating special discovery processes—namely, a presumptive discovery
ban—in FOIA cases. Courts have boldly declared: “[D]iscovery is an extraordinary procedure in a FOIA action;”96 “When the courts have permitted discovery in FOIA cases, it is generally limited to the scope of the agency’s
search;”97 “Discovery is generally unavailable in FOIA actions;”98 and “FOIA
actions typically do not involve discovery.”99 This per se blanket rule is some89

Plaintiff’s Motion to Allow Discovery (filed Apr. 28, 2009), Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d
965 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 03-00173).
90
Id. at 4–5. In particular, this motion detailed that the affiant, the Executive Vice President,
General Counsel and Corporate Security of the Fairchild Corporation, had twice sought to
evade service of a subpoena for a deposition in the previous Herrick case, and that, based on
the circumstances, it was unlikely he had personal knowledge about the records in question
and that his characterization of the records was conflicted in some aspects with the FAA’s
characterization. Id.
91
Taylor v. Babbitt, 673 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2009).
92
Id. Rule 56(f) has been recodified at FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d), and provides that:

93

If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present
facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny
it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other
appropriate order.

Taylor, 673 F. Supp. at 23.
Id.
95
See id.
96
Thomas v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Food and Drug Admin., 587 F. Supp. 2d
114, 115 n.2 (D.D.C. 2008).
97
El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 583 F. Supp. 2d 285, 301 (D Conn. 2008).
98
Wheeler v. CIA, 271 F. Supp. 2d 132, 139 (D.D.C. 2003).
99
People for the Am. Way Found. v. Nat’l Park Serv., 503 F. Supp. 2d 284, 308 (D.D.C.
2007).
94
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times explained as emanating from a presumption that agencies tell the truth:
“Affidavits submitted by an agency are ‘accorded a presumption of good faith,’
accordingly, discovery relating to the agency’s search and the exemptions it
claims for withholding records generally is unnecessary if the agency’s submissions are adequate on their face.”100 That is, except in extraordinary circumstances, no testing of the veracity of agency affidavits in FOIA cases is allowed.
Typically, in other civil litigation, courts are extremely hesitant to grant
motions for summary judgment before a party has had an adequate opportunity
to take discovery.101 In fact, one treatise describes how courts “have wisely
hesitated to grant a motion for summary judgment before the nonmovant has
had an adequate opportunity to complete discovery concerning the matters
raised in the summary judgment motion.”102 The rules even provide the presumptive deadline for filing such a motion as thirty days after discovery has
ended, and list the types of evidence that may be used to support the motion as
precisely the types of evidence gleaned in discovery: depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, admissions, and interrogatory answers,
among others.103 Accordingly, for proceduralists, it goes nearly without saying
that summary judgment is designed to resolve cases in which there are no
genuine issues of material fact based upon the evidence obtained during discovery.
Thus, perhaps even more bizarre than FOIA decisions that declare a ban on
discovery is another common refrain, echoed in the Taylor case, which declares
that in FOIA cases discovery is not permitted until after summary judgment
motions have been made and denied. As the Eleventh Circuit declared: “The
plaintiff’s early attempt in litigation . . . to take discovery depositions is inappropriate until the government has first had a chance to provide the court with
the information necessary to make a decision on the applicable exemptions.”104
In one typical D.C. District Court decision, the court oddly asserted that whether a FOIA case “warrants discovery is a question of fact that can only be determined after the defendants file their dispositive motion and accompanying
affidavits.”105 Thus, the rules of discovery are held to operate differently in
100

Carney v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted) (quoting Safecard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
101
See EDWARD J. BRUNET ET AL., SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.7
(2014) (“Indeed, some decisions unequivocally assert that an award of summary judgment is
premature if the nonmovant has not had a chance to commence discovery.”).
102
Id.; see also Subrin & Main, supra note 2, at 1844 (describing that the rules, by design,
gave judges “the authority to enter a summary judgment after the discovery of relevant facts
and before a trial only in very limited circumstances”).
103
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b), (c)(1).
104
Miscavige v. IRS, 2 F.3d 366, 369 (11th Cir. 1993).
105
Murphy v. FBI, 490 F. Supp. 1134, 1136 (D.D.C. 1980); see also Krieger v. Fadely, 199
F.R.D. 10, 14 (D.D.C. 2001) (explaining that discovery in FOIA cases should “ordinarily
occur after the government moves for summary judgment”); cf. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 185 F. Supp. 2d 54, 65 (D.D.C. 2002) (ruling that rather than allow the
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FOIA cases than in other civil litigation, and judges expressly rely on their discretion to fashion these substance-specific rules.106
That is not to say that discovery in FOIA cases is never allowed, but that
unlike other cases, plaintiffs must make motions and convince a court—usually
having to demonstrate egregious misconduct by the government—before they
are granted the right to use discovery tools. For instance, in Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs,
the D.C. District Court allowed limited discovery in circumstances where the
agency’s own declarations suggested it had destroyed relevant records, the
agency subsequently admitted some statements in its own declarations were
false, and the agency withheld relevant information from the plaintiffs as a result of litigation tactics.107 In other cases where discovery was allowed, the record already contained strong indications of agency bad faith or the agency
failed to produce facially adequate affidavits.108 The high hurdles for the exceptions prove the general rule, however, that discovery is almost never allowed in
a FOIA case, despite its formal availability under the rules.
Not only do courts uniformly come down against discovery in FOIA cases,
these special procedural standards have been codified in precedential opinions
of circuit courts. Very early in FOIA’s history, in Goland v. CIA, the D.C. Circuit ruled that where the plaintiff had made no showing of bad faith and the
agency affidavit was facially adequate, the district court did not err in denying
the plaintiff the opportunity for discovery.109 The District Court for the District
of Columbia, bound by D.C. Circuit precedent, hears a vastly disproportionate
number of FOIA cases, amounting to nearly 40 percent of all such cases nationwide.110 In fact, Goland has been cited for its discovery ruling nearly a
hundred times.111 Other circuits have followed suit. The Second Circuit, citing
Goland, has held that “discovery relating to the agency’s search and the exemptions it claims for withholding records generally is unnecessary if the
FOIA plaintiff discovery after the denial of a summary judgment motion, “when an agency’s
affidavits or declarations are deficient regarding the adequacy of its search, as they are here,
the courts generally will request that the agency supplement its supporting declarations”).
106
For example, in Taylor, the court in denying discovery cited Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 627 F.2d 365, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1980) for the proposition that “courts have ample authority to set limitations to protect agencies from oppressive discovery.” Taylor v. Babbitt,
673 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23 (D.D.C. 2009).
107
Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t Veterans Affairs, 828 F.
Supp. 2d 325 (D.D.C. 2011).
108
See, e.g., Landmark Legal Foundation v. EPA, 959 F. Supp. 2d 175, 184 (D.D.C. 2013)
(citing a failure to search relevant records and evidence the agency purposefully attempted to
“skirt disclosure under the FOIA”); Long v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 10 F. Supp. 2d 205, 210
(N.D.N.Y. 1998) (granting discovery because the affidavits did not reasonably describe the
search).
109
Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
110
Margaret B. Kwoka, The Freedom of Information Act Trial, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 217, 261
(2011).
111
Goland, 607 F.2d at 339 at West Headnotes 9, 11.
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agency’s submissions are adequate on their face.”112 The Ninth Circuit has declared that while normally discovery is available to any party, in FOIA cases
“courts may allow the government to move for summary judgment before the
plaintiff conducts discovery.”113 The Eleventh Circuit has stated that FOIA
plaintiffs’ attempts to take discovery are “inappropriate until the government
has first had a chance to provide the court with the information necessary to
make a decision on the applicable exemptions.”114 These precedent-setting rulings do not merely apply the individualized exercise of discretion to particular
FOIA cases, but instead announce deviations from the Federal Rules that apply
in a single substantive area.
B. Trials Denied
Substance specificity in FOIA procedure does not end with discovery, but
also permeates the method of arriving at ultimate decisions in FOIA cases
through unique applications of summary judgment. The formal summary
judgment standard prescribes, of course, that judgment should only to be entered when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”115 Facts are material if they might
affect the outcome of the case,116 and disputes as to those facts are genuine if a
reasonable fact finder could find in favor of either party.117 Any genuine disputes of material fact would preclude judgment being entered for either party
and would require, instead, a trial.
To be sure, the charge has been made as a general matter that summary
judgment is too often used to resolve fact disputes that could affect the outcome, and that the power of summary judgment may be invading the province
of the trier of fact.118 These critiques of the use of summary judgment generally
112

Carney v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1994).
Lane v. Dep’t of Interior, 523 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2008).
114
Miscavige v. IRS, 2 F.3d 366, 369 (11th Cir. 1993).
115
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
116
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 252 (1986).
117
Id. at 247–48, 252 (requiring more than the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” on
both sides).
118
See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper
Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 203 (1993)
(contending that summary judgment is being inappropriately used to resolve questions of
fact in civil rights cases to the detriment of plaintiffs); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to
Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 982 (2003)
(expressing “concern that courts have extended the use of summary judgment and the motion to dismiss to resolve disputes that are better left to trial and the jury”); Jeffrey W.
Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 190 (1988) (arguing that the 1986 so-called summary judgment trilogy inappropriately increases the power
of the judge over the jury); Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV.
1897, 1945 (1998) (“In sixty years summary judgment has grown from a wobbly infant to an
113
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to resolve civil lawsuits are important to potential reforms to our procedural
system as a whole.119
As to FOIA cases, however, the problem of courts resolving material fact
disputes on summary judgment motions has reached a different level, both in
degree and in kind. First, as a matter of degree, empirical evidence suggests
that FOIA cases go to trial significantly less frequently than other civil cases.120
In FOIA litigation, over a thirty-year period, only 0.71 percent of all cases were
resolved by trial.121 By contrast, as to other civil cases over the same time period, trials resolved 3.44 percent of lawsuits.122 In fact, not only are the numbers
low, they have been falling precipitously; it is fair to say that in the last ten
years, there have been essentially no FOIA trials.123 In place of trials, the numbers also strongly suggest that the cases that otherwise would go to trial are
overwhelmingly being resolved by summary judgment.124
Second, the absence of FOIA trials is not surprising in light of the special
procedural rules courts have adopted for using summary judgment in FOIA
cases. Courts are quick to explain that summary judgment is not simply one
way of deciding FOIA cases, but rather is the preferred or presumptively appropriate way to decide them. They describe the use of summary judgment in
FOIA cases by saying: “FOIA cases are generally and most appropriately resolved on motions for summary judgment;”125 “Summary judgment is the procedural vehicle by which nearly all FOIA cases are resolved;”126 “FOIA actions
aggressive gatekeeper to access to trial—by jury or otherwise”). It has even been argued that
summary judgment is a wholly unconstitutional violation of the Seventh Amendment right to
trial by jury. Suja A. Thomas, Essay, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L.
REV. 139 (2007).
119
See, e.g., Subrin & Main, supra note 2, at 1852–53 (describing how a shift in summary
judgment practice that increases its prevalence over trials is an element of a new era of civil
procedure that should be judged as a whole).
120
Kwoka, supra note 110, at 260.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 257–58 & n.222. There is one notable exception, which is a FOIA case concerning
trade secret information in which the business submitter intervened as a defendant and the
case was resolved via a true bench trial. See In Def. of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 656
F. Supp. 2d 68, 70 (D.D.C. 2009).
124
Kwoka, supra note 110, at 260. Among other civil cases, resolution by motion occurred
12.08 percent of the time, while in FOIA cases, motions resolutions accounted for 38.09 percent of all cases. Id. While the motions resolutions numbers reported include more than
merely summary judgment motions because of the data collection methods by the Federal
Judicial Center, for FOIA cases summary judgment almost certainly dominates because
agencies must submit affidavits to support claims of exemption and are unable to move for a
judgment on the pleadings or to dismiss. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826–28 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (explaining the requirements for an affidavit submitted by the agency in a FOIA
case).
125
Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Agency,
811 F. Supp. 2d 713, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
126
L.A. Times Commc’ns, LLC v. Dep’t of the Army, 442 F. Supp. 2d 880, 893 (C.D. Cal.
2006).
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are typically and appropriately resolved on summary judgment;”127 and “Summary judgment is the preferred procedural vehicle for resolving FOIA disputes.”128
The implication of resolving nearly all FOIA cases on summary judgment
motions is that any factual disputes that do exist and that would or could affect
the outcome of the case will be resolved on summary judgment motions, not
through the full trial process involving live witness testimony, cross examination, and oral arguments.129 While courts seem to think that this result is appropriate because FOIA cases hardly ever involve factual disputes,130 the reality is
that whether exemptions apply to certain records often involves a factual inquiry.131 For example, whether records were prepared to aid in making a decision or to defend a decision already made might not be apparent from the face
of the record, but may make all the difference as to whether records fall under
the deliberative process privilege.132 Or, as in Taylor’s case, whether records
have been disclosed previously may wholly change the outcome on a claim of
commercial confidentiality.133
As with discovery rules, in fashioning special summary judgment rules for
FOIA cases, courts are not merely applying the summary judgment standard on
an individual basis and tending to find that it resolves most cases. Rather, district courts are following circuit precedent directing them to use summary
judgment to resolve essentially all FOIA disputes, regardless of their nature.
For example, the Eleventh Circuit minced no words in declaring that,
“[g]enerally, FOIA cases should be handled on motions for summary judgment,
once the documents in issue are properly identified.”134 The D.C. Circuit
(again, perhaps the most influential court in the area of FOIA law) has explained that “we have created exceptions to the normal summary judgment review processes applicable to litigation under [FOIA],” and that at the summary
127

Landmark Legal Foundation v. EPA, 959 F. Supp. 2d 175, 180 (D.D.C. 2013).
Adamowicz v. IRS, 552 F. Supp. 2d 355, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
129
I have explained elsewhere the probable detriment to FOIA plaintiffs that results from
this lack of procedural opportunities. Kwoka, supra note 110, at 264–76.
130
See, e.g., Shannahan v. IRS, 637 F. Supp. 2d 902, 912 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (“The usual
summary judgment standard does not extend to FOIA cases because the facts are rarely in
dispute and courts generally need not resolve whether there is a genuine issue of material
fact.”).
131
For a full accounting of the most common types of factual inquiries in FOIA cases, see
Kwoka, supra note 110, at 227–44.
132
Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (requiring that records be both “predecisional” and “deliberative” to be exempt on the basis of the
deliberative process privilege); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2012) (exempting from
FOIA’s mandatory disclosure provisions any records that would ordinarily be privileged
from discovery in civil litigation against the agency).
133
See Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F.3d 1184, 1193 (10th Cir. 2002) (“In response the government argues that only actual public disclosure of the documents would eliminate their ‘secret’ nature.”).
134
Miscavige v. IRS, 2 F.3d 366, 369 (11th Cir. 1993).
128

1512

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:1493

judgment stage, “[w]hen the district court reviews an agency’s [affidavit] to
verify the validity of each claimed exemption, its determination resembles a
fact-finding process.”135
Perhaps even more strikingly, however, is that five circuits have rejected in
the FOIA context the otherwise applicable de novo standard of appellate review for district court’s summary judgment orders; instead, they acknowledge
the fact-finding inherent in the district courts’ summary judgment decisions by
reviewing them for clear error.136 In essence, courts have, through precedential
decisions, effectively revised the Federal Rule governing summary judgment in
the FOIA context to allow district courts to resolve factual disputes presented
in summary judgment motions.
The anomalies of summary judgment procedures in FOIA cases do not end
there. Take, for example, the case of Eduardo Benavides. Benavides, a federal
prisoner, filed FOIA requests with the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) for recordings of telephone conversations between himself and his attorney that occurred
while he was incarcerated.137 BOP denied his request, claiming, among other
things, that the records fell within FOIA’s law enforcement exemption to mandatory disclosure, and he filed a lawsuit challenging that claim.138 The government promptly moved for summary judgment,139 and Benavides cross-moved
for summary judgment in his favor.140
A central dispute in the case was the application of the law enforcement
exemption.141 In FOIA litigation, the burden is on the government to show that
an exemption applies.142 As to a law enforcement exemption claim, one essen135

Summers v. Dep’t of Justice, 140 F.3d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
The Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh articulate the standard of review for summary
judgment decisions in FOIA cases as applying a de novo standard to legal conclusions and
clear error to factual findings. McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1242 (3d Cir.
1993); Hunton & Williams v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 590 F.3d 272, 275–76 (4th Cir. 2010);
Lane v. Dep’t of the Interior, 523 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2008); News-Press v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 489 F.3d 1173, 1189 (11th Cir. 2007). The Seventh Circuit articulates its
standard of review as first determining if there is an adequate factual basis for the district
court’s decision and then reviewing the decision as a whole for clear error. Enviro Tech
Int’l, Inc. v. EPA, 371 F.3d 370, 373–74 (7th Cir. 2004).
137
Benavides v. Bureau of Prisons, 774 F. Supp. 2d 141, 143 (D.D.C. 2011).
138
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2012). Specifically, BOP invoked exemption 7(C), which covers
records that are compiled for law enforcement purposes and the release of which “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Defendant’s
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment at
10, Benavides, 774 F. Supp. 2d 141 (No. 09-2026) [hereinafter Benavides Summary Judgment Memo]. The personal privacy concerns the BOP invoked were those of Benavides’s
attorney, the other party on the telephone calls. Id. at 12.
139
Benavides Summary Judgment Memo, supra note 138.
140
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of His Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Benavides, 774 F. Supp. 2d 141 (No. 09-2026).
141
See id. at 5–10.
142
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4).
136
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tial element is a demonstration that records are compiled “for law enforcement
purposes,”143 which requires the government to “identify a particular individual
or incident as the object of the investigation and specify the connection of the
individual or incident to a potential violation of law or security risk.”144 To
meet its burden to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact
that the records in question were compiled for law enforcement purposes, BOP
submitted an affidavit that averred, in relevant part, that BOP has various enforcement powers and is “tasked with the law enforcement mission of protecting inmates, staff, and the community.”145 It further averred that recordings of
telephone conversations are made “for the purpose of monitoring inmate telephone activity and conducting investigations regarding violations of illegal activites or suspected illegal activities being conducted, coordinated or directed
from within a BOP facility.”146 However, as the district court later found, the
affidavit “neither identifie[d] a particular individual or incident subject to an
investigation nor connect[ed] a particular individual or incident to a potential
violation of law.”147 That is, the court concluded that the government offered
no evidence whatsoever that could allow a reasonable fact-finder to find in its
favor on an essential element of its claim.
Were the case decided according to typical Rule 56 standards, the failure of
the party with the burden of proof to produce any evidence on an essential element of a claim at the summary judgment stage would be fatal, resulting in
judgment entered for the opposing party.148 Rather than grant Benavides’s motion, however, the court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment as
to the law enforcement exemption claim, specifying that only the BOP’s motion was denied without prejudice to refile.149 That is, the party who bore the
burden of proof and failed to produce any evidence to meet that burden received more favorable treatment by being allowed to rewrite its affidavits and
try for summary judgment again. In essence, if the government fails to come up
with sufficient evidence on its first try in a FOIA case, it will be allowed what I
have termed elsewhere a “do-over.”150
Admittedly, the precedential appellate case law on this question is somewhat more mixed than is the case with other special FOIA procedures. At one
143

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).
Benavides v. Bureau of Prisons, 774 F. Supp. 2d 141, 145 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Davin
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 60 F.3d 1043, 1056 (3d Cir. 1995)).
145
Declaration of Larry Collins, Attachment to Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, at para. 17, Benavides, 774 F.
Supp. 2d 141 (No. 09-2026).
146
Id. at para. 15.
147
Benavides, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 147.
148
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.”).
149
Benavides, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 147.
150
Kwoka, supra note 66, at 231–33.
144
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point, the D.C. Circuit went out of its way to affirm the decision of the district
court to order immediate release of records as to which the government had
produced an inadequate affidavit supporting exemption, rather than allowing
the government a second try.151 At best, however, the circuits have given highly mixed signals. The D.C. Circuit has also held that “in camera review may be
particularly appropriate when . . . the agency affidavits are insufficiently detailed,” suggesting that entry of judgment against the government is hardly the
first recourse in such a situation.152 The First Circuit has admitted having “cautioned against ordering immediate disclosure of documents based on an agency’s admittedly flawed affidavit,” but has also, in another case, upheld the denial of a second chance to the agency.153 In another circumstance, the Third
Circuit has squarely held that it is error not to consider revised affidavits when
the initial ones fail.154 While the circuit courts may be sending somewhat
mixed signals, the intonation of the decisions suggests that the safest recourse
is to permit the government another chance, and the district courts are consistently allowing do-overs in FOIA cases.155
Taken together, summary judgment procedures in FOIA cases depart drastically from summary judgment in other substantive areas of the law. District
courts follow circuit precedent requiring the presumptive use of summary
judgment—not the presumptive use of trial—to resolve all FOIA disputes.
Moreover, courts routinely condone and encourage district courts to allow the
government, the party with the burden of proof, multiple attempts at producing
sufficient evidence to survive, or even win, a summary judgment motion.
Summary judgment has thus become a substance-specific practice for FOIA
litigation.
III. COSTS TO THE JUDICIARY
As the previous part demonstrated, courts have created through a common
law type process a special set of procedures used to decide cases brought under
FOIA. These processes deviate not only from the processes used in other cases,
but from the codified Federal Rules of Civil Procedure themselves. Debates
over the merits of substance-specificity have abounded in the literature.156 And
certainly, some substance-specific procedural rules may be sound policy in particular instances.157
151

Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Quiñon v. FBI, 86 F.3d 1222, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
153
State of Maine v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 73 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing Irons
v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468 (1st Cir. 1979)).
154
Coastal States Gas Corp v. Dep’t of Energy, 644 F.2d 969, 980 (3d Cir. 1981).
155
Kwoka, supra note 66, at 233 & n.307.
156
For examples of arguments against substance-specificity, see note 32 (citing sources).
157
See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and
Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 831–32 (1986) (“I
hope that my analysis of problems created by the application of trans-substantive preclusion
152
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FOIA litigation may even be ripe for substance-specific processes (albeit,
likely not those described above).158 That said, because of the way that these
procedural rules for FOIA have been created—eschewing the legislative or
rulemaking process—they create significant costs, which can be grouped into
three categories. First, the creation of substance-specific rules in this fashion
undermines the legitimacy of the judiciary. Second, the process used results in
rules themselves that are substantively flawed and fail to advance Congress’s
goals in enacting FOIA. And third, the perception on both sides—from the judiciary and the litigants—that the litigation process is not working to resolve
FOIA disputes has led to the beginning stages of a movement to relocate FOIA
dispute resolution to alternative non-judicial venues. All three of these downsides implicate institutional concerns of the third branch.
A. Loss of Legitimacy
So-called “neutrality” of procedural rules has been lauded as a virtue to be
embraced.159 The word neutrality, however, must be carefully defined in this
context. Neutrality as to substantive outcomes, such that the procedural rules
are not favoring one side or the other of particular substantive disputes, while
never perfect, is typically the type of neutrality sought with respect to process.160 Procedural rules surely embody other types of value judgments—about
the value of certain process to truth seeking, justice, efficiency, acceptability,
etc.—but not the same sorts of value judgments policymakers engage in when
determining substantive rights and remedies.161
The reform movement resulting in the Federal Rules embraced the idea
that neutrality was a central goal. For instance, rulemaking authority was
placed principally with the Supreme Court, an institution seen as least susceptible to political pressure.162 In addition, the Rules Enabling Act dictated neutralrules will contribute to the reconsideration of some of the basic [transsubstantivity] assumptions of modern procedural systems.”); Subrin, Fudge Points, supra note 1, at 28 (making a
case for “selective substance-specific procedure,” particularly with regards to discovery).
158
I have described the costs of the current version of specialized procedures in FOIA elsewhere. See Margaret B. Kwoka, Deference, Chenery, and FOIA, 73 MD. L. REV. 1060
(2014) (documenting a litigation paradox wherein deference, including through special processes, is given agency decisions, but agencies are not constrained by another key administrative law principle, the Chenery principle, requiring them to defend their actions on the
rationale stated at the time the decision was made); Kwoka, supra note 66, at 200 (explaining how these and other specialized procedures contribute to deference to government claims
of secrecy and undermine transparency laws).
159
See Carrington, supra note 31, at 2074.
160
See id. (“Neutrality with respect to the interests of particular groups of disputants is an
obvious objective, indeed perhaps a paramount value, of any enterprise engaged in dispute
resolution.”).
161
See Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18, at 380 (“If value is defined as a
choice of substantive policy, a law is value-neutral if it does not directly regulate conduct ‘at
the stage of primary private activity.”).
162
Carrington, supra note 31, at 2075.
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ity, mandating that the rules not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right.”163 And, importantly, the Rules were expressly designed to be transsubstantive, applying equally to “all civil actions and proceedings in the United
States district courts.”164
Transsubstantivity itself is a principle of neutrality that deserves special attention. When one rule must govern all cases, the likelihood that a particular
substantive goal motivates the design of the rule is diminished; after all, if a
rulemaker disfavors a particular type of claim, making a rule that would hinder
its advancement would also hinder the advancement of all other types of
claims, including the ones that the rulemaker may favor.165 As Professor Subrin
has declared, “we now know that once one starts debating which procedures
are best for which types of cases, it becomes obvious that political decisions are
being made.”166
The fact that substance-specific rules may reflect underlying policy choices
does not necessarily make such rules inadvisable, but it does have important
implications about who should have the power to engage in that type of rulemaking and how those rules should be made.167 Even advocates for substance
specificity admit that assigning responsibility for “meshing procedure and substance” to a particular actor is difficult.168
Professor Marcus has persuasively demonstrated that “trans-substantivity
strengthened the case for the neutrality of procedural reform, and thus the legitimacy of doctrinal development outside political arenas.”169 That is, confining
courts to transsubstantive rulemaking guards against abuse of the rulemaking
power they have been granted, because a transsubstantive rule is less likely to
be motivated by particular political goals.170 As Professor Marcus succinctly
says, typically, “substance-specific rules must come from the political process,”
because courts can legitimately generate only transsubstantive rules.171 Thus,
even the Supreme Court-supervised federal rulemaking process would suffer a
legitimacy deficit if it ventured far into the territory of substance specificity.172
163

28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).
FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
165
See Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 1, at 384.
166
Id.
167
Id. (noting that the initial civil rules Advisory Committee “certainly did not want to raise
congressional ire by overtly stepping into substantive areas of law—this was the province of
elected officials”).
168
Subrin, Fudge Points, supra note 1, at 54 (“There is the remaining issue of under whose
auspices such a meshing of process and substance should take place. This is my place for
fudging.”).
169
Marcus, Trans-substantivity and the Processes of American Law, supra note 58, at
1210–11.
170
See id.
171
Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18, at 416.
172
Marcus, Trans-substantivity and the Processes of American Law, supra note 58, at 1220,
1229. Marcus also dubs trans-substantivity a sort of “second best” by constraining process
law where circumstances prevent the law maker from making legitimate choices. Id. at 1236.
164
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Individual courts engaging in a sort of common law process for creating
substance-specific rules, as is the case in FOIA litigation, stand on even worse
footing. Even though there is unquestionably federal power to make federal
procedural rules, that responsibility primarily lies with Congress, except when
Congress chooses to delegate it to the judiciary.173 And federal courts are, of
course, not empowered as a general matter to engage in making common
law.174 Substance-specific procedural rules walk a fine line, and may often
cross that fine line, into substantive law making. This is particularly true where
the substance-specific rules made through a common law process conflict with
the federal rules Congress has adopted through the rulemaking process.175
Other common law departures from the federal rules have been similarly
criticized as lacking legitimacy. For example, even prior to Twombly and Iqbal,
courts regularly imposed a sort of heightened pleading standard in civil rights
cases, despite the fact that under the Federal Rules, notice pleading applies
across substantive areas.176 In another instance, courts routinely refused to certify class action lawsuits brought under the Truth in Lending Act even though
they met the Rule 23 standards for certification, effectively writing an “exception” into the rule.177 In each instance, these departures provoked criticism of
the courts for overstepping their role.
The concern about judge-made, substance-specific procedure is not merely
theoretical: social science literature demonstrates that the public’s perception of
the legitimacy of legal actors hinges largely on whether the process is apparently fair.178 In determining if a process appears fair, litigants and the public hold
as a central factor the evident neutrality of the decision maker.179 Whatever the
merits of substance-specific process in some areas—or even in FOIA litigation
173

See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (“For the constitutional provision for a
federal court system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts.”). There
certainly remains some federal common law making power with respect to procedure as to
which Congress’s ability to override is a matter of some debate. See Amy Coney Barrett,
Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 833–34 (2008). Here, however, substancespecific procedural rules not only flirt with the substance/procedure divide, but also collide
with mandates in the duly enacted federal rules. And in any event, Congress currently exercises vast control over federal court procedure. Id. at 887.
174
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“There is no federal general
common law.”).
175
See Barrett, supra note 173, at 887 (noting agreement that Congress has used the rulemaking power to largely control the procedures of the federal courts).
176
See generally Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551
(2002) (discussing how federal courts have welcomed heightened pleading standards in certain situations).
177
Marcus, Trans-substantivity and the Processes of American Law, supra note 58, at
1244–45.
178
For a discussion of how the social science literature on procedural justice applies to
FOIA litigation, see Margaret B. Kwoka, Leaking and Legitimacy, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1387, 1419–34 (2015).
179
See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 137–38 (2006).
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specifically—courts lack the authority to create that set of rules on their own
through a common law type process. Departing from the transsubstantive rules
in certain classes of cases opens courts up to attack because it implicates underlying value judgments about the substance of the laws themselves, and, consequently, engages in policy decisions that should be reserved for the political
branches.
B. Ineffective Procedural Rules Embraced
Beyond the legitimacy problems courts may face by making substancespecific procedural rules through a common law process, such a processmaking method is also more likely to result in substantively undesirable rules.
Courts in individual cases may not be able to take into account the full range of
information necessary to make good substance-specific rules, and are ill
equipped to make final policy decisions.180 FOIA litigation provides a good example: while courts have correctly identified oddities in FOIA cases that may
warrant substance-specific rules, they have crafted rules that hinder, rather than
advance, Congress’s objectives in passing FOIA.181
The nature of the decision-making exercise in which courts engage impedes good substance-specific procedural rules from emerging. In individual
cases, courts are presented only with a single circumstance and record concerning that particular dispute.182 They are not presented with the kind of overall
data or range of issues that might arise in that type of litigation more generally,
the sort of information that would be considered in the rulemaking process or
in Congress.183
For instance, some courts have justified limiting discovery in FOIA cases
on the basis that “the underlying case revolves around the propriety of reveal-

180

Even the Supreme Court, to whom Congress delegated rulemaking power in the Rules
Enabling Act, implicitly acknowledged its limitations when, acting unilaterally, it created an
Advisory Committee tasked with actually writing the rules. See David Marcus, Institutions
and an Interpretive Methodology for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2011 UTAH L.
REV. 927, 931 (describing the origins of the rulemaking process). The Committee decided to
seek public input as part of the process. Id.
181
See Kwoka, supra note 66, at 221–35.
182
Relatedly, Nancy Leong has demonstrated that courts’ rulings are distorted when they
face issues in only one context, rather than seeing a broad range of contexts for the issue to
arise. See Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 406 (2012). And Suja Thomas
has documented how courts ruling on atypical cases are prone to making bad law. Suja A.
Thomas, How Atypical, Hard Cases Make Bad Law (See, e.g., The Lack of Judicial Restraint
in Wal-Mart, Twombly, and Ricci), 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 989, 992 (2013). These are
further examples of how courts’ narrow views when deciding an individual case can stymie
good decision making at the macro level.
183
This type of information would help a decision maker ascertain what are known as legislative facts or “generalized statements about the world that help the court decide questions of
law and policy.” Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L.
REV. 1255, 1265 (2012).

Summer 2015]

TRANSSUBSTANTIVITY: FOIA EXAMPLE

1519

ing certain documents.”184 This rationale seems to assume that the only possible relevant discovery would be the documents themselves, a request for which
would be an inappropriate end run around the merits of the dispute. Certainly,
in some cases plaintiffs have made such inappropriate requests.185 Those instances may, however, be coloring courts’ views of the appropriateness of discovery in all cases. Many FOIA disputes will center on issues that are not apparent in the content of the requested records,186 and discovery as to those
issues may be entirely appropriate, as was the case in Taylor.187
In addition, courts may draw incorrect conclusions from their observations,
not having the full policy vetting that goes with legislative rulemaking and public participation. In the FOIA context, courts have frequently noted that the
“lack of knowledge by the party seeing [sic] disclosure seriously distorts the
traditional adversary nature of our legal system’s form of dispute resolution.”188 That is certainly true, and yet, this fact led the D.C. Circuit not to seek
the most disclosure possible from the government (for instance, by permitting
discovery), but rather by essentially substituting the normal discovery obligations with a requirement that the government produce a single affidavit known
as a Vaughn index that lists the withheld records and brief justifications for the
corresponding claims of exemptions.189 Judge Bazelon dissented, stating:
“Without discovery, a party to litigation may not have access to facts necessary
to oppose a motion for summary judgment. This problem is especially acute for
plaintiffs in FOIA cases.”190 That is, the judges on the D.C. Circuit recognized
an oddity in FOIA cases—an inherent information imbalance between the parties—but could not agree as to what procedures would best remedy the problem, a quintessential policy decision.
Other courts have made assumptions about the nature of FOIA disputes
that contribute to the overuse of summary judgment and which also do not hold
up to scrutiny. These courts often assert that FOIA cases involve pure questions
of law, because once the documents are identified, the only dispute is about the
applicability of the statutory exemptions to disclosure.191 In reality, however,
184

Lane v. Dep’t of Interior, 523 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2008).
Kwoka, supra note 66, at 226 & n.259 (listing cases).
186
See Kwoka, supra note 110, at 234–44.
187
See supra notes 74–106 and accompanying text.
188
Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
189
Id. at 827–28; see also Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 352–55 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating
that if Vaughn index requirements are met, the district court “has discretion to forgo discovery and award summary judgment on the basis of affidavits” and announcing a requirement
that a plaintiff demonstrate agency bad faith before discovery may be had).
190
Goland, 607 F.2d at 357 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
191
See, e.g., Trentadue v. Integrity Comm., 501 F.3d 1215, 1226 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Whether a FOIA exemption justifies withholding a record is a question of law that we review de
novo.”); Am. Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. Dep’t of the Army, 842 F. Supp. 2d 859, 866 (E.D. Va.
2012) (“In general, FOIA disputes are, and should be, resolved by way of summary judgment. This is so because FOIA cases generally involve disputes not about triable issues of
185
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fact disputes permeate claims of exemption. For instance, the law enforcement
exemption depends on an agency’s claim about the reason why the record was
created—something that may not be apparent from the document itself.192 The
same inquiry—why the record was made—is similarly relevant for the deliberative process privilege.193 And like in Taylor’s case, the trade secrets exemption may turn on who has already seen the records, another dispute of fact.194 In
fact, fact disputes can be at the heart of all of the most frequently claimed exemptions to disclosure.195
Charles Clark, the “architect” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asserted that procedure should be the “handmaid and not the mistress” to justice,
that is, that procedure should serve the ends of the substantive law and nothing
more.196 Professor Marcus posits that there are specific instances in which
courts may create substance-specific procedures, including when the circumstances suggest the institutional limitations of courts are mitigated or where
other actors are even more limited in their competency.197 An example of the
former would be when courts are attempting to achieve the policy objectives of
the substantive law more accurately by creating a substance-specific procedure.198 This type of substance-specific procedure obtains its legitimacy from
the underlying legislative decision regarding the substantive area of law.199
Professor Marcus admits, however, that what advances Congress’s underlying objectives may be in the eye of the beholder,200 and FOIA’s substancespecific procedures, even if well-intentioned, seem to fall far short. Denying
FOIA plaintiffs access to discovery, subjecting their factual disputes to resolution at summary judgment, and giving the government multiple bites of the apple all tilt the playing field in favor of the government.201 This result seems to
fly in the face of Congress’s underlying policy goals of strong, de novo judicial
review to achieve maximum government transparency under FOIA.202
fact, but rather how the law is to be applied to the documents withheld; as a result, once the
documents at issue have been properly identified, typically only questions of law remain.”).
192
See Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (describing how in an agency
that has some law enforcement functions and some non-law enforcement functions, “a court
must scrutinize with some skepticism the particular purpose claimed for disputed documents
redacted under FOIA Exemption 7”).
193
See Access Reports v. Dept. of Justice, 926 F.2d 1192, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (engaging
in a detailed analysis of the purpose of the disputed record, and finding that the memo was
sought “in part as ammunition for the expected fray, in part as advice on whether and when
to duck”).
194
See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text.
195
Kwoka, supra note 110, at 234–44.
196
Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 1, at 961–62.
197
Marcus, Trans-substantivity and the Processes of American Law, supra note 58, at 1237.
198
Id. at 1237, 1243.
199
Id. at 1244.
200
Id.
201
Kwoka, supra note 66, at 235.
202
Id.
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That court-made, substance-specific procedure in the context of FOIA results in counterproductive rules may be somewhat a matter of chance. It is always possible courts will devise rules that in fact advance laudable objectives.
But the judiciary’s lack of legislative-type information and competency at making policy choices suggests that it is unlikely to consistently create desirable
rules. These institutional limitations council strongly against substance specificity in rules fashioned by individual judges.
C. Bypassing the Courts
A final concern resulting from the tension between the Federal Rules and
common-law-made, substance-specific procedures is the possibility that the
system will appear so broken to litigants that judicial remedies will no longer
be desirable.203 As has been discussed, courts feel that FOIA litigation under
the Federal Rules is akin to forcing a square peg into a round hole, and have
fashioned their own procedures.204 Those procedures, in turn, have left litigants
without effective remedies, and the situation seems untenable from all angles.205 As a result, a trend is emerging toward removing cases from the court
system in favor of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
Formal reform efforts have often focused on shunting cases into alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms.206 Professor Subrin posits that such a move
should be no surprise in light of the equity-based Federal Rules, which themselves embody such broad discretion that formal litigation fails to provide predictable results.207 As Professor Subrin has said, ADR processes bring attention
to the fact that certain types of cases may warrant different types of process.208
Another scholar dubbed this trend a “flight from law.”209
There has been considerable push to move FOIA dispute resolution to
some sort of ADR mechanism. In 2007, Congress passed the OPEN Government Act, which established the Office of Government Information Services
(“OGIS”), housed at the National Archives and Records Administration.210
OGIS is designed to serve as a sort of FOIA ombudsman and provides voluntary mediation services for requesters and agencies in disputes.211
203

See supra Part III.A (discussing legitimacy concerns).
See supra Part III.B. (discussing the failure of the court-created substance-specific procedures in FOIA litigation).
205
See supra Part III.B.
206
Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 1, at 911–12.
207
Id. at 988–89.
208
Id. at 991.
209
Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and
Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 716 (1988).
210
Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110175, § 10, 121 Stat. 2524, 2529 (2007).
211
Id. In full, it provides: “The Office of Government Information Services shall offer mediation services to resolve disputes between persons making requests under this section and
204
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Separately, the Administrative Conference of the United States, an independent research agency designed to improve administrative processes, recently took up the issue of ADR for FOIA disputes, strongly recommending more
use of the OGIS mechanism and consideration of ADR in place of litigation.212
Other academic proposals have gone further and suggested binding arbitration
mechanisms for FOIA in lieu of litigation.213
While ADR may be a perfectly fine option for some disputes, it should not
be the option of last resort simply because litigation is failing to meet its objectives. Strict adherence to formally transsubstantive rules may push courts to
make their own substance specificity, but they are unlikely to make the most
effective policy choices. The end consequence may be an undesirable one: the
wholesale removal of classes of litigation from the court system.
CONCLUSION
“Procedure is power, of course, so the stakes of choosing one over the other produces different winners and losers.”214 The choice of winners and losers
is all the more direct when crafting substance-specific rules. When we adhere
too strictly to the principle of transsubstantivity, judges “chafe[] against its
constraints.”215 This tension has played out in FOIA litigation, resulting in a set
of substance-specific procedures crafted in a process akin to creating common
law.216 Not only does this type of substance specificity threaten to undermine
the legitimacy of the judiciary, but it is unlikely to produce the best policy
choices and may drive litigants from the courthouse to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.217 While FOIA litigation represents a small sample of the
federal docket, the example it provides illustrates the dangers of overadherence to transsubstantive design as a formal matter, and sheds light on the
problems with empowering judges to take substance specificity into their own
hands.

administrative agencies as a non-exclusive alternative to litigation and, at the discretion of
the Office, may issue advisory opinions if mediation has not resolved the dispute.” Id.
212
MARK H. GRUNEWALD, REDUCING FOIA LITIGATION THROUGH TARGETED ADR
STRATEGIES 2 (2014), available at https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents
/Grunewald%20Draft%20FOIA%20Report.pdf. Specifically “the study concludes that the
most important targeting should be directed toward the dispute resolution mechanism itself
. . . . The study makes a series of recommendations to foster the development and dispute
resolution centrality of OGIS—the targeting choice made in the first instance by Congress.”
Id.
213
See Michael Bekesha, James Madison Would Not Litigant FOIA Disputes: Fixing FOIA
Through ADR, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Fall 2009, at 10, 10.
214
Subrin & Main, supra note 2, at 1856.
215
Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18, at 373.
216
See supra Part II.
217
See supra Part III.

